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Volume 41 Summer 1976 Number 3
PRODUCTS- LIABILITY: A REMEDY IN SEARCH OF
A DEFENDANT - THE EFFECT OF A SALE OF




The volume of products liability actions has increased greatly in the
last ten years.' Some actions have involved injured parties whose claims
would ordinarily permit recovery, but the likelihood of recovery is dimin-
ished because at least one of the most likely prospective defendants, usually
the manufacturer of the product, is no longer in existence. This is fre-
quently due to the fact that this prospective defendant is a corporation
which has been dissolved before the unsatisfactory nature of the product
has become apparent to the injured party, or before any injury has oc-
curred, or at least 'before any legal action has been commenced seeking
recovery for the product dissatisfaction claim. Facing such a situation,
plaintiffs have urged the courts to impose liability for the defective product
on some other entity which may not have been associated with the distribu-
tion, sale, or manufacture of the product.
These attempts to impose responsibility for defective products on third
parties have met with mixed results. A number of different theories have
been used. Other theories appear to be available, at least in some situations,
which would allow for recovery against the dissolved corporation or its
former shareholders. These theories, and the limitations upon the ability
of those who have suffered from product dissatisfaction to utilize these
theories, are the topic of this article.
Before beginning to investigate the different theories available to
those seeking to find a defendant in this type of situation, a discussion
of one aspect of the underlying law of products liability is necessary.
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia, Visiting Associ-
ate Professor of Law, University of Illinois; B.S., City College of New York, 1964;
J.D., SUNY-Buffalo, 1967.
1. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 3, 1972, at 1, col. 8. The Wall Street Journal
report states that there were an estimated 500,000 product liability court cases
in 1971 and that the number is expected to grow to one million by 1985.
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There are three principal theories under which an entity which suffers
product dissatisfaction may proceed against those who participated in
the manufacture and distribution of the product: negligence, breach of
warranty, and strict liability in tort.2 A detailed discussion of these theories
is beyond the scope of this article.3 However, the variance in the statutes
of limitations for these theories is integrally involved in the following
discussion and thus requires some comment.
As a general rule, the tort statute of limitations is applied to negli-
ence and strict liability in tort claims.4 Tort statutes of limitations do not
usually begin to run until injury, or until the defect in the product was
or should have been discovered; they vary in duration from state to state
and are commonly from one to five years in length. 5
A contract statute of limitations is ordinarily applied to product
dissatisfaction claims expressed under a breach of warranty theory. Most
of these claims are asserted under the implied warranty of merchantability
2. Other theories of recovery are sometimes used. These include violation
of a statutory duty to warn and violation of statutory standards of quality. In
many cases, these standards have been established by federal legislation. See,
e.g., National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. § 1381
et. seq.; Consumer Product Safety Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2051 et. seq. (1972), discussed
in Martel, The Consumer Product Safety Act and Its Relation to Private Products
Litigation, 10 FORUM 337 (1974); Patton & Butler. The Consumer Product Safety
Act-Its Impact on Manufacturers and on the Relationship between Seller and
Consumer, 28 Bus. LAw. 725 (1973); Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1261 et. seq. (1970), discussed in Comment, Federal Hazardous Sub.
stances Legislation, 13 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 504 (1972).
3. The basics of product liability, and a comparison of the various theories
on which recovery can be based, are well presented in Dickerson, The ABC's of
Products Liability-With a Close Look at Section 402A and the Code, 36 TENN. L.
REv. 439 (1969); Donovan, Recent Developments in Products Liability Litigation
in New England: The Emerging Confrontation Between the Expanding Law of
Torts and the Uniform Commercial Code, 19 MAINE L. REv. 181 (1967); Jenkins,
The Product Liability of Manufacturers: An Understanding and Exploration, 4*
AKRON L. REV. 135 (1971); Pasley, The Protection of the Purchaser and Consumer
Under the Law of the U.S.A., 32 MOD. L. REv. 241 (1969); Rapson, Products Lia.
bility Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial Code
and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RuT. L. REv. 692 (1965); Reitz & Seabolt, Warranties
and Product Liability: Who Can Sue and Where?, 46 TEMp. L.Q. 527 (1973);
Shanker, Pigeonholes, Privity and Strict Products Liability, 21 CAsE W. Rrs. L. R.v.
722 (1970); Speidel, Products Liability, Economic Loss and The UCC, 40 TENN. L.
REv. 309 (1973); Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and The Uni.
form Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REV. 713 (1970); Wade, On the Nature of
Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss L.J. 825 (1973).
4. Burch, A Practioner's Guide to the Statutes of Limitations In Products
Liability Suits, 5 U. BAIT. L. REv. 23, 35 (1975); Henn & Alexander, Effect of Corpo.
rate Dissolution on Products Liability Claims, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 865, 875 (1971).
5. Comment, Statutes of Limitations, Their Selection and Application in
Products Liability Cases, 23 VAqN. L. REv. 775, 785 (1970). See, e.g., Morton v.
Texas Welding & Mfg. Co., 408 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (2 years from time
of injury); Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973) (2 years
from time of injury). But see, Prokolin v. General Motors Corp., CCH PROD. LiAn.
REP,. f 7629 (Conn. 1972) (3 years from time of sale). Victorson v. Bock Laundry




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [1976], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss3/7
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
found in article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.6 In the absence
of disclaimers7 or attempts to shorten its duration,8 the implied warranty
of merchantability is subject to a statute of limitations of four years from
the time of sale.9
The applicable statute of limitations is an important consideration
in the type of cases which are the subject of this article because many of
these cases involve a product which was manufactured and sold a con-
siderable number of years before the product dissatisfaction claim arose.
In the typical cases, an employee or other user of a product is injured by
a product which had been acquired by the employer, the user, or some
other person several years before the injury occurred. The injured party
has a product dissatisfaction claim under which recovery could, at least
theoretically, be based on either negligence, warranty, or strict liability
theories. If the corporation which manufactured the product has been
dissolved during the interim, and there are no other viable prospective
defendants in the chain of distribution,10 the obvious defendant is the
dissolved corporation itself.
II. CLAIMs AGAINST DISSOLVED CORPORATIONS
Under the common law, a corporation's capacity to sue or be sued
terminated when the corporation was legally dissolved.1 This well-estab-
6. UNIFORI COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314. The implied warranty of fitness
found in the Uniform Commercial Code is of limited value because it only applies
to goods to be used for a particular, rather than a general, purpose.
7. The warranties provided by the Uniform Commercial Code may be dis-
claimed by careful draftsmanship which meets the requirements of section 2-316(2).
8. Uniform Commercial Code section 2-725(1) provides that the parties
may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year, but the period
may not be extended.
9. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-725 (1), (2). The Code dearly commences
the running of the statute of limitations at the time of sale. However, in Morton
v. Texas Welding & Mfg. Co., 408 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. Tex. 1975), the court held
that the statute of limitations on a products liability claim based on a warranty
theory did not begin to run until the time of injury. See also, Maynard v. General
Elec. Co., 486 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1973). Maynard is representative of the minority
position that products liability actions involving personal injury claims are always
subject to the tort statute of limitations, regardless of the theory of recovery which
has been pleaded.
10. In any particular case, other parties associated with the manufacture
and distribution of the product which causes damage or loss to an individual may
not be viable defendants for any number of practical considerations. There may
also be legal considerations militating against a claim against such parties. Lack
of privity with those in the chain of distribution continues to prevent the success-
ful assertion of products liability claims, at least under warranty theories, in some
jurisdictions. See, Dickerson, The ABC's of Products Liability-With a Close Look
at Section 402A and the Code, 36 TENN. L. REV. 439, 445 (1969); Donovan, Recent
Developments in Products Liability Litigation in New England: The Emerging
Confrontation Between the Expanding Law of Torts and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 19 MAINE L. REv. 181, 193-95 (1967).
11. W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE Cos'oATTioNs §§ 8127, 8142-43
(1962); Schoone, Shareholder Liability upon Voluntary Dissolution of Corporations,
44 MAR9QuEmE L. REv. 415, 419 (1961); Comment, Safeguarding the Creditors of
Corporations, 36 HARy.. L. REv. 509 (1923); Comment, Suits By and Against Dis-
1976]
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lished rule was equated to the common law rule regarding suits by -and
against deceased individuals. In Oklahoma Gas Co. v. Oklahoma,12 the
United States Supreme Court observed:
It is well settled that at common law and in the federal juris-
diction a corporation which has been dissolved is as if it did not
exist, and the result of the dissolution can not be distinguished
from the death of a natural person in its effect. It follows there-
fore, that as the death of the natural person abates all pending
litigation to which such a person is a party, dissolution of a corpo-
ration at common law abates all litigation in which the corpora-
tion is appearing either as plaintiff or defendant.13
The common law rule actually went beyond the rule expressed in the
Oklahoma Gas case. The dissolution of the corporation not only abated
litigation in progress, it abated all causes of action which existed by or
against the corporation, even if the actions had not yet been commenced.1 4
The property of the dissolved corporation may, at least in part, have
escheated to the Crown,' 5 leaving creditors without a defendant to pursue.
Modern corporations statutes pass the assets of a dissolved corpora-
tion to its shareholders.' 6 Every jurisdiction now has statutory provisions
dealing with the matter of litigation by and against dissolved corporations.' 7
The effect of these statutes is to modify the harshness of the common law
rule and allow the corporation to sue and be sued following dissolution.
Generalizations about the effect of these statutes on the continued vitality
of claims against a dissolved corporation are difficult to make. Perhaps
as many as half of the states have statutes which resemble section 105 of
solved Corporations, 48 IowA L. REv. 1006, 1006-1009 (1963); In re Ellis, 53 Hawaii
23, 487 P.2d 286 (1971); Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 52 Wis. 2d 325, 190 N.W.2d 521
(1971).
12. 273 U.S. 257 (1927).
13. Id. at 259.
14. W. FL-rcHERI, supra note 11, at § 8172; Schoone, supra note 11, at 419.
15. Addy v. Short, 47 Del. 157, 89 A.2d 136 (1952); State ex rel. McDowell
v. Libby, 238 Mo. App. 36, 175 S.W.2d 171 (K.C. Ct. App. 1943); City of Klamath
Falls v. Bell, 7 Ore. App. 330, 490 P.2d 515 (1971). The historical comment to
sections 78-90 of the Model Business Corporation Act states:
Until a century ago, the courts followed Lord Coke's statement of
the effects of dissolution: realty reverted to the donor, personalty escheated
to the sovereign, and choses in action were extinguished with the death
of the corporation. Fox v. Horah, 36 N.C. 358, 36 Am. Dec. 48 (1841);
Coulter v. R. Robertson, 24 Miss. 278, 57 Am. Dec. 168 (1852). This posi-
tion, which resulted from dicta in Prior of Spalding's Case, [1467] 7 Edw.
IV (but is contrary to Johnson v. Norway, [1622] Winch 37), no longer
obtains with respect to business corporations. Health v. Leary, 120 N.C.
90, 26 S.E. 630, 38 L.R.A. 240 (1897).
MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. §§ 78-80 jf 3.01 (ABA 1960). There is some question
as to whether this rule ever applied to business -corporations with shareholders.
N. LATrIN, THm LAw oF CoRPoRATIoNs § 176 (1971); Schoone, Shareholder Liability
Upon Voluntary Dissolution of Corporation.. 44 MARQUErE L. Rav. 415, 416-1/
(1961).
16. W. FLETCHER, supra note 11, at § 8224; N. LATrN, supra note 15, at § 184;
H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 381 (1970).
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the Model Business Corporation Act,l8 but even in these states the statutes
are not uniform. The statutes in the remaining states vary considerably.
These variations are of critical importance in at least two respects.
The length of time following the actual dissolution during which a
suit must be commenced, either by or against the corporation, runs as
long as five years, although most states have adopted either a two or
three year rule.19 The period of time within which to assert a claim pro-
vided for in these statutes is not in the nature of a statute of limitations.
These statutes merely postpone the abatement which occurred at the time
of dissolution under the common law. This distinction is important. The
effect of these statutes is to require the commencement of the suit within
the allowable period,20 regardless of when or even if the statute of limita-
tions on the claim has begun to run. No distinction is drawn between
claims which have already ripened before the period has run and those
which are at best contingent at the time the allowable period expires.21
18. MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr § 105 provides:
The dissolution of a corporation either (1) by the issuance of a cer-
tificate of dissolution by the Secretary of State, or (2) by a decree of court
when the court has not liquidated the assets and business of the corpora-
tion as provided in this Act, or (3) by expiration of its period of duration,
shall not take away or impair any remedy available to or against such
corporation, its directors, officers, or shareholders, for any right or claim
existing, or any liability incurred, prior to such dissolution if action or
other proceeding thereon is commenced within two years after the date of
such dissolution. Any such action or proceeding by or against the corpora-
tion may be prosecuted or defended by the corporation in its corporate
name. The shareholders, directors and officers shall have power to take
such corporate or other action as shall be appropriate to protect such
remedy, right or claim. If such corporation was dissolved by the expiration
of its period of duration, such corporation may amend its articles of
incorporation at any time during such period of two years so as to extend
its period of duration.
19. Citations to the state statutes are collected in the Model Business Corpo-
ration Act Annotated following section 105. According to Fletcher, most states
have adopted a 2 or 3 year period. W. FLrrCHER, supra note 11, at § 8169.
However, the period is extended to 5 years, at least in Tennessee and Alabama.
See, Gary Furniture and Appliance Co. v. Skinner, 288 Ala. 617, 264 So. 2d 174
(1972). Until a relatively recent amendment, Washington's statute abated all claims
against dissolved corporations. See, United States ex rel. Acme Granite & Tile Co.
v. F. D. Rich Co., 437 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1970); Jesse A. Bland Co. v. Knox
Concrete Prods., Inc., 207 Tenn. 206, 388 S.W.2d 605 (1960).
20. Johnson v. Helicopter 9: Airplane Serv. Corp., 404 F. Supp. 726 (D. Md.
1975); Litts v. Refrigerated Transp. Co., 375 F. Supp. 675 (M.D. Pa. 1973); Stone
v. Gibson Refrigerator Sales Corp., 366 F. Supp. 733 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (construing
Ill. law); Chicago &- Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Hospers Pack. Co., 363 F. Supp.
697 (N.D. Iowa 1973).
21. Christensen v. Boss, 179 Neb. 429, 138 N.W.2d 716 (1965). Phrasing the
claim as an equitable one will not avoid the statutory provisions, since it has been
held that the statutes apply to all types of claims, including equitable actions.
Koepke v. First Nat'l Bank, 5 Ill. App. 3d 799, 284 N.E.2d 671 (1972). It is,
however, possible to avoid the time requirements in some states. In Delaware, for
example, 8 DEL. CODE § 278, the anti-abatement statute, requires the commencement
of an action within 3 years of dissolution. However, a claimant may request the
appointment of a receiver under § 279, and the court may do so without
regard to the limitations of § 278, Smith-Johnson Steamship Corp. v. United
5
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This problem may best be illustrated by considering an injured party
with a strict liability or negligence claim. As noted earlier, the statute of
limitations for such claims generally commences with discovery of the
defect. However, if the responsible corporation has been dissolved several
years before the claim arose, the claimant may be unable to press his
claim because the grace period provided by these postponed abatement
statutes has expired, even though the statute of limitations period has
barely begun.
This same problem can arise for a product dissatisfaction claim based
on a warranty theory. However, the warranty statute of limitations begins
to run at the time of sale, and, at least in the case of a sale of goods
governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, is only four years. Conse-
quently, in most fact situations the postponed abatement statute will not
shorten the period in which a claimant must act in order to assert a
timely claim.
Another distinction between these varying statutes is the ability of
claimants to assert post-dissolution claims. Under the wording of the
Model Act, it appears that only claims which arose before the corporation
was dissolved may be asserted during the statutorily created period follow-
ing dissolution.2 2 In jurisdictions which have not adopted the Model Act,
the language of the statute may not compel such an interpretation, and
claims which arise following dissolution, but within the allowable period
prescribed by the statute, may also be asserted against the corporation.23
States, 231 F. Supp. 184 (D. Del. 1964); Ross v. Venezuelan-American Independent
Oil Pro. Assn., Inc., 230 F. Supp. 701 (D. Del. 1964). See also, Matthies v. Seymour
Mfg. Co., 23 F.R.D. 64 (D. Conn. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 270 F.2d 365
(2d Cir. 1959).
It is also possible to avoid the time limitations if the dissolution has not been
properly conducted. See, e.g., Johnson v. Rac Corp., 491 l.2d 510 (4th Cir. 1974)
(corporation may continue to be liable if it engages in excessive business activities
during "winding up" stages of dissolution); United States ex rel. Small Business
Administration v. Palakow, 488 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1971) (Director-shareholder
individually liable for failure to give notice of dissolution in action commenced
after allowable period had expired); Dr. Hess & Clark, Inc. v. Metalsalts Corp.,
119 F. Supp. 427 (D.N.J. 1954) (corporation continues to be potential defendant
even if dissolved in state of incorporation if it failed to properly withdraw from
state of New Jersey after having qualified to do business). Contra, Johnson v.
Helicopter & Airplane Serv. Corp.), 404 F. Supp. 726 (D. Md. 1975); People v.
Parker, 30 Ill. 2d 486, 197 N.E.2d 30 (1964) (Director liable for failure to give
notice of intent to dissolve corporation).
22. Stone v. Gibson Refrigerator Sales Corp., 366 F. Supp. 733 (E.D. Pa.
1973); Bishop v. Schield Bantam Co., 293 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Iowa 1968); Chadwick
v. Air Reduction Co., 239 F. Supp. 247 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
23. Chadwick v. Air Reduction Co., 239 F. Supp. 247 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (con-
struing Ohio statute). Because the anti-abatement statutes modify a common law
rule, the states are free to fashion the modification in whatever form they desire,
and lack of uniformity does not offend any constitutional principal.
The power to take the long step of putting an end to the corporate
existence of a state-created corporation without limitation, connotes the
power to take the shorter one of putting an end to it with such limitations
as the legislature sees fit to annex.
Title Co. v. Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. 120, 128 (1937).
[Vol. 41
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This distinction becomes important in jurisdictions following the Model
Act rule because the effect of the postponed abatement statute is merely
to provide a grace period during which pre-dissolution claims may be
asserted. In those situations where the incident which gave rise to the
claim occurred after dissolution but before the allowable period expired,
a claimant could not assert a claim based on a strict liability in tort
theory. However, the claimant could still assert a claim under a breach
of warranty theory because warranty claims are deemed to arise at the
time of sale.
Very few of the reported cases dealing with claims against dissolved
corporations involve product dissatisfiction claims. This is perhaps some
evidence that the relatively short time period during which a claim must
be asserted against the corporation under the postponed abatement statutes
makes these statutes of little value to such claimants. At least in situations
where the incident giving rise to the claim occurs many years after sale
of the product and almost as many years after dissolution, the postponed
abatement statutes are hardly the source of a meaningful remedy for
product dissatisfaction claimants.2 4 The claimant might then be tempted
to seek to recover from the former shareholders of the dissolved corpora-
tion.
III. CLAims AGAINST FORmER SHAREHOLDERS OF
THE DISSOLVED CORPORATION
When a corporation is dissolved, the assets of the corporation are
occasionally distributed directly to the shareholders. More often, the
assets are sold to a third party or parties, the known liabilities are paid,
24. It is possible to structure an argument that, at least under postponed
abatement statutes similar to the Model Act provision, a post-dissolution claim
may be asserted against the corporation even after the allowable period has run
because the statute only requires that pre-dissolution claims be asserted within
the allowable period. Such a result would not only benefit claimants, but it
would avoid the anomolous result of barring claims which may not yet have
even arisen. Support for this argument comes from two decisions suggesting that
shareholders could assert claims of the dissolved corporation after the allowable
period because the statute only prevented the corporation from suing. Levy v.
Liebling, 238 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1956); Jesse A. Bland Co. v. Knox Concrete
Prods., Inc., 207 Tenn. 206, 388 S.W.2d 605 (1960). There is, however, persuasive
authority to the contrary. See U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers v. Pan-Amer. Gyro-
Tex. Co., 345 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Gordon v. Loew's, Inc., 147 F. Supp.
298 (D.N.J. 1956). The argument seems contrary to the often expressed concept
that the postponed abatement statutes are in derogation of the common law.
Unless the statutes specifically provide relief from the traditional abatement rule,
the action must be deemed abated. The argument also runs afoul of the policy
behind abating causes of action after what appears to be a reasonable time during
which to allow claims:
There should be a definite point in time at which the existence of
a corporation and the transaction of its business are terminated. To allow,
as the plaintiff contends, the continued prosecution of lawsuits perverts
the definiteness and orderly process of dissolution so as to produce a
continuous dribble of business activity contrary to the intent of the wind-
ing up provisions of the statute.
Bishop v. Schield Bantam Co., 293 F. Supp. 94, 96 (N.D. Iowa 1968). See also,
19761
7
Wallach: Wallach: Products Liability: A Remedy in Search of a Defendant
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
and the rcmaining consideration received on the sale of the assets is dis-
tributed to the shareholders. Even if a suit can still be brought against
the dissolved corporation under a postponed abatement statute, in many
instances the corporation will no longer have any assets from which to
satisfy the claim. In other cases, the expiration of the grace period under
the postponed abatement statute will prevent a suit against the dissolved
corporation. In either case, the holder of the product dissatisfaction claim
must find a way to pursue his claim against the former shareholders.
Prior to the adoption of postponed abatement statutes, an equitable
theory evolved to alleviate the harshness of situations which resulted when
a corporation was dissolved. Under this theory, creditors of all kinds could
pursue the shareholders of a dissolved corporation in order to satisfy
their claims against the corporation itself. This equitable doctrine has
been referred to as the "trust fund" theory. 25
This equitable doctrine has been applied consistently for the past
150 years, and there are numerous examples of its use in recent cases. 20
The theory has been described in the following language:
Where the assets of a dissolved corporation have been dis-
tributed among the stockholders, a creditor of the dissolved corpo-
ration may follow such assets as in the nature of a trust fund into
the hands of stockholders. The creditors have the right to subject
such assets to their debts and for that purpose the stockholders
hold them as though they were trustees.27
The cases which apply the doctrine appear to make no distinction
between claims which were asserted against the corporation before dis-
solution and those which were first asserted following dissolution.28 The
Johnson v. Rac. Corp., 491 F.2d 510, 512-13 (4th Cir. 1974); Litts v. Refrigerated
Transp. Co., 375 F. Supp. 675 (M.D. Pa. 1973); Gary Furniture and Appliance
Co. v. Skinner, 288 Ala. 617, 624, 264 So. 2d 174, 181 (1972).
25. Norton, Relationship of Shareholders to Corporate Creditors upon Dis-
solution: Nature and Implications of the "Trust Fund" Doctrine of Corporate
Assets, 30 Bus. IAw. 1061, 1062 (1975); Schoone, Shareholder Liability Upon
Voluntary Dissolution of Corporation, 44 MARQuETrE L. R:v. 415, 418-19 (1961);
Comment, Suits By and Against Dissolved Corporations, 48 IowA L. REv. 1006,
1006-09 (1963); Comment, Safeguarding the Creditors of Corporations, 36 HARV.
L. REv. 509, 543-45 (1923); Cowden Mfg. Co. v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 1204
(E.D. Ky. 1972).
26. See, e.g., Stewart v. United States, 326 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1964); Cowden
Mfg. Co. v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Ky. 1972); Drew v. United
States, 367 F.2d 828 (Ct. C1. 1966); King v. Coosa Valley Mineral Prods. Co.,
283 Ala. 197, 215 So. 2d 275 (1968); Thomas v. Harper, 14 Ariz. App. 140, 481
P.2d 510 (1971); Zinn v. Bright, 9 Cal. App. 3d 188, 87 Cal. Rptr. 736 (1970);
John Julian Const. Co. v. Monarch Builders, Inc., 306 A.2d 29 (Del. Super.
1973); Godshall v. Hessen, 227 So. 2d 506 (Fla. App. 1969); Menconi v. Davison,
80 II. App. 2d 1, 225 N.E.2d 139 (1967); Collins v. Richland Aviation Sew.,
Inc., 225 So. 2d 241 (La. App. 1969); Town of Hampton v. Hampton Beach Im-
provement Co., 107 N.H. 89, 218 A.2d 442 (1966).
27. Koch v. United States, 138 F.2d 850, 852 (10th Cir. 1943).
28. The following cases involve claims which had been asserted before dis-
solution: Gaskins v. Bonfils, 79 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1935); King v. Coosa Valley
Mineral Prods. Co., 283 Ala. '197, 215 So. 2d 275 (1968); John Julian Const. Co.
[Vol. 41
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doctrine seems to apply whenever a creditor has an unsatisfied claim
against a corporation which has been dissolved.
Many of the postponed abatement statutes apply to actions against
former shareholders, officers, and directors, in addition to actions against
the corporation itself.2 9 Thus, these statutes now provide a legal remedy
which can be used when the assets of a dissolved corporation have been
distributed to the former shareholders.
There is an interrelationship between the postponed abatement statutes
and the "trust fund" theory which has not been carefully considered by
the courts thus far.3 0 The "trust fund" theory arose to alleviate the harsh-
ness of the rule that dissolution abates all actions and claims against a
corporation. The postponed abatement statutes also serve the same general
function. This raises the question of whether the enactment of the abate-
ment statutes bars further resort to the "trust fund" theory.3 1
At first glance, there appears to be no reason why the "trust fund"
theory and the postponed abatement statutes could not co-exist. A claimant
would then have alternative remedies at his disposal. The availability
of the "trust fund" theory can be critical to the success of product dis-
satisfaction claims against dissolved corporations and their former share-
holders. Where the cause of action has arisen before dissolution, it should
make little if any difference to the claimant if the action is treated as
one covered by the postponed abatement statute or by the "trust fund"
theory.32 However, if the statutory approach is exclusive and the cause
v. Monarch Builders, Inc., 306 A.2d 29 (Del. Super. 1978); Collins v. Richland
Aviation Serv., Inc., 225 So. 2d 241 (La. App. 1969).
The following cases involve claims which may have existed prior to dissolu-
tion, but were not asserted by the creditor until after dissolution: Hutton v.
Commissioner, 59 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1982); Drew v. United States, 367 F.2d 828
(Ct. Cl. 1966); Zinn v. Bright, 9 Cal. App. 3d 188, 87 Cal. Rptr. 736 (1970);
Godshall v. Hessen, 227 So. 2d 506 (Fla. App. 1969).
29. The Model Business Corporation Act provision is of this type. See text
of section 105 at note 18 supra. Approximately half of the statutes expressly cover
directors, officers and shareholders. Z. CAvrTcH, BusINEsS ORGANIZATIONS § 189.02 (1)
(c) (1975).
30. Z. CAVITCH, BusINEsS ORGANIZAT-IONS § 189.02 (1) (C), (1) (d) (1975).
31. One of the few cases dealing with the problem is Reconstruction Finance
Corp. v. Teter, 117 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 620 (1941). The
court clearly refused to allow the plaintiff to proceed under a "trust fund' theory
but the reason for the result is not clear. It appears that the complaint was dis-
missed because the plaintiff failed to comply with the procedural prerequisites
associated with an equitable action. The plaintiff had failed to show that he had
exausted his remedies against the corporation, a requirement that is ordinarily
satisfied by obtaining a judgment and a writ of execution followed by a return
of the writ nulla bona by the sheriff. Thus, it appears that the complaint was
dismissed for procedural errors. The decision is read differently by several authori-
ties, who suggest that the court concluded that the "trust fund" cause of action
was unavailable once a postponed abatement statute had been adopted. See
Norton, supra note 26, at 424-26. Schoone, supra note 26, at 726-27, admits the
basis for the decision is not entitrely dear. See also cases cited note 35 infra.
32. One important difference is the exaustion of legal remedies requirement
normally associated with equitable actions. Ordinarily, the plaintiff must show
that he has been unable to collect his claim from the corporation. See, e.g.,
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of action does not arise until after dissolution, the claimant may find
himself without a defendant to pursue, at least in those states where the
statutes do not allow assertion of post-dissolution claims against a corpo-
ration or its shareholders. 33 Even where post-dissolution claims may be
asserted under the statute, the period within which these claims must be
asserted will be considerably shorter under most of the statutes than it
would be under the equitable statute of limitations associated with the
"trust fund" theory.34
Ordinarily the strongest indication of whether the two approaches
should remain equally available would be legislative intent. Unfortunately,
the intent of the draftsmen who wrote these statutes and of the legisla-
tures which adopted them is far from clear. The intent of the draftsmen
of the Model Business Corporation Act, which has served as a model for
many of these statutes, is nowhere clearly stated. The comments to sec-
tion 105 of the Model Act, which contains the postponed abatement
statute, seem to suggest that the equitable action no longer has a purpose
to fulfill now that the states have adopted legislation which remedies the
harshness of the common law abatement rule.35 This could be construed
as an intent to eliminate the use of the "trust fund" theory. Only in
Wisconsin is the intent, at least of the draftsmen of the statute, clearly
known.
A number of early Wisconsin decisions addressed themselves to this
co-existence question, and concluded that Wisconsin's postponed abate-
ment statute did not displace the "trust fund" theory, so creditors could
pursue the former shareholders of a dissolved corporation even after the
statutory grace period for pursuing the corporation had expired. 38 It was
the intention of the draftsmen of the 1951 Wisconsin Business Corporation
-Law to statutorily overrule these decisions3 7 by making the statutory
remedy exclusive. This would necessarily require that an action against
the former shareholders be commenced within the statutory grace period.
The only decision in Wisconsin which has raised the issue since the
Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Teter, 116 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1941); Zinn v.
Bright, 9 Cal. App. 3d 188, 87 Cal. Rptr. 736 (1970). However, several decisions
have recognized that this requirement can be excused where the corporation clearly
has no assets and an attempted execution on corporate property would be a
"useless thing" or an "idle formality." Stewart v. United States, 327 F.2d. 201
(10th Cir. 1964); Drew v. United States, 367 F.2d 828 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
33. See text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
34. Z. CAvrrcH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 189.02 (1) (d) (1975). Cavitch sug-
gests that the most common statute of limitations on equitable claims is 10 years.
See also Schoone, supra note 26, at 428. In many states, however, equitable actions
are subject to the statute of limitations applicable to the underlying legal cause
of action. J. PoM.Roy, EQUITY JURIsPRUDENCE § 419 (1941).
35. MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr. ANN. § 105 j[ 2 Comment (A.B.A. 1971).
36. State ex rel. Pabst v. Circuit Court, 184 Wis. 301, 199 N.W. 213 (1924);
Lindemann v. Rusk, 125 Wis. 210, 104 N.W. 119 (1905). See also West Milwaukee
v. Bergstrom Mfg. Co., 242 Wis. 137, 7 N.W.2d 587 (1943).
37. Young, Some Comments on the New Wisconsin Business Corporation Law,
1952 Wis. L. REv. 5, 14-15.
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adoption of the new statute found it unnecessary to determine the legis-
lature's intent in passing the statute because the statute was found to be
inapplicable to the case before the court.3 8
Recent cases from other jurisdictions have allowed recovery under the
"trust fund" theory.3 9 However, legislative intent to bar recovery under
that theory by the adoption of postponed abatement statutes apparently
was not argued.
Aside from an actual intent by the legislatures to statutorily overrule
the "trust fund" theory, the postponed abatement statutes logically would
serve no real function if the "trust fund" theory survived the adoption of
such statutes.40 The "trust fund" theory allows for the assertion of all
creditor claims under a relatively long statute of limitations. What could
be the purpose of a statute which, at best, allows for the assertion of the
same claims, and in some instances a smaller class of claims, during a
shorter period of time?
There are a number of possible answers to this argument. The post-
poned abatement statutes were designed to alleviate the harshness of the
common law abatement rule. These statutes may well have been proposed
without considering the extent to which the "trust fund" doctrine already
had alleviated the problem. Thus there may well have been no intention
to affect the viability of the "trust fund" theory. Logic may not produce
the correct answer to this question. The answer should be, but has not
been, found in history. The motives of the legislatures may have been to
provide an alternative approach because the "trust fund" theory may not
have been as satisfactory a remedy as it would at first appear to be.
All of the recent cases utilizing the "trust fund' approach have
involved claims which existed against the corporation at the time it was
dissolved, even if the claim had not been asserted actively at the time
of dissolution. In contrast, claims based on post-dissolution injuries are
at best contingent liabilities where the future plaintiff has not yet suffered
any product dissatisfaction. There appears to be no clear authority for
the use of the "trust fund" theory in such circumstances, although there
is nothing in the underlying nature of the theory to suggest its inapplica-
bility in such cases. However, the "trust fund" theory, because of its
equitable nature, is subject to the usual prerequisites of an equitable
action, and the statutes may have been proposed so that creditors could
assert their claims without first satisfying these prerequisites, which require
that the claimant show that his legal remedies are non-existent or have
been exhausted without success. In most cases, this means that the claim-
ant must first get a judgment against the dissolved corporation and then
execute against the corporation's property without recovering his judg-
38. Security Nat'l Bank v. Cohen, 31 Wis. 2d 656, 143 N.W.2d 454 (1966).
39. See cases cited note 28 supra.
40. Miller, The Status of Choses in Action of Dissolved But Unadministered
Corporations After Expiration of the Statutory Period for Winding Up, 9 Miss.
L.J. 455, 462-64 (1937).
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ment in full.41 Thus, it may be that the postponed abatement statutes
were intended only to provide a remedy which avoided these prerequisites,
and that there was no intent to eliminate the availability of the "trust
fund" theory.
Even if the adoption of the statutes was not intended to eliminate
the "trust fund" theory, the equitable nature of the theory may suggest
this result. Equitable remedies exist to supply relief where no legal remedy
exists, or where the existing legal remedy is inadequate under the circum-
stances of a particular case.42 The "trust fund" theory evolved to fill a
void in creditor's remedies created by the common law abatement rule.
Now that a statutory remedy exists, it may be argued that an adequate
legal remedy is available which deprives the court of equitable juris-
diction.
This conclusion has been reached in a number of analogous situations.
The most important such situation involves the continued availability
of equitable creditor's remedies when previously unavailable legal means
of reaching the debtor's assets have been enacted.48 For example, where
execution was not available against the interest of a debtor in a trust,
a remedy was available in equity. But once a legislature allowed creditors
to reach such interests by legal execution, the courts ruled that the equita-
ble procedure was no longer available to creditors. 4 4
It should be noted, however, that equity principles are by no means
absolute. The equity principle examined above was used to explain the
availability of equitable relief in the absence of a legal remedy. It was
thus used to create equity jurisdiction, not to eliminate it. Its use to
eliminate the availability of the "trust fund" theory as a means of relief
is an improper application of the principle. Furthermore, the situations
involving the expansion of the types of interests subject to the reach
of creditors by legal execution are not apposite here because they involve
a dear legislative intent to provide one remedy in lieu of another. Such
an intention is not readily apparent in the postponed abatement statutes.
A number of courts, when faced with the argument that exceptions
should be created to allow actions against corporations which had not
been commenced or carried forward properly within the requirements of
41. J. Pmo, EQurry JU isPitUDENCE § 1415 (1941).
42. D. DOBBS, LAw oF REMEDIES § 2.5 (1973); H. McCLINTOCM, PRINCIPLS OF
EQunTY §§ 43-47 (1948).
43. J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1415 (1941). The coexistence prob-
lem has been raised in other contexts. Compare, e.g., Scheibner v. Scheibner, 199
Mich. 630, 165 N.W. 660 (1971) (equity retains jurisdiction to construe wills after
statute gives power to construe wills to probate courts) with Brooks v. Hargrave,
179 Mich. 136, 146 N.W. 325 (1914) (equity does not retain jurisdiction to order
accounting by executor once statute gives such power to probate court). See also
Leone v. Bear, 241 S.W.2d 1008 (Mo. 1951) (statute requiring redemption bond
from mortgagor as a condition precedent to exercising statutory right of redemp-
tion is not exclusive, and mortgagor may bring action in equity seeking relief
from sale).
44. J. PoMEROY, supra note 41, § 1415.
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a postponed abatement statute, have refused to do so on the theory that
time is critical in the assertion of claims against dissolved corporations.
This appears to be based on a policy argument in favor of the dissolved
corporation that there should be a definite time after which claims could
not be asserted. 45 Under this approach final distribution of assets can
be accomplished without fear of late claims by creditors. If creditors could
pursue claims against the shareholders long after the assets or the con-
sideration received on their sale had been distributed, the shareholders
would be exposed to a long period of uncertainty regarding potential
claims. That would seem to conflict with the statutes, which create a lim-
ited and definite grace period for asserting claims against the corporation,
and in most cases, its directors, officers, and shareholders.
However, the need for promptness in regard to claims against the
corporation does not necessarily exist for the shareholders. The relatively
short grace period of the postponed abatement statutes has been created
so that at the expiration of the grace period the corporation's existence,
and its records, could be finally dosed. The short period is a response
to fears of the later appearance of a creditor who might resurrect the
corporation for the sole purpose of defending a dissatisfaction claim long
after its officers and directors have turned to other endeavors. The share-
holders, however, continue to function as individuals, and to enjoy the
assets of the former corporation or the fruits of those assets. Allowing
creditors to assert claims against them under the "trust fund" theory,
while creating uncertainty, does not prevent the final termination of an
entity, as does the possibility of delayed claims against the dissolved
corporation.
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of the equal availability
of the "trust fund" theory and the abatement statutes is the general public
policy favoring products liability claims. This policy has been justified
on several grounds-it encourages manufacturers to produce safer products,
spreads the cost of the consequences of unsatisfactory products among all
users and consumers, and prevents a single individual from having to
bear the sometimes astronomical and unaffordable losses caused by a
product which injured him without fault on the consumer's part.46 This
- policy supports co-existence of the two theories because of the claimants'
increased opportunities for recovery.
45. See, e.g., Litts v. Refrigerated Transp. Co., 375 F. Supp. 675 (M.D. Pa.
1973); Bishop v. Schield Bantam Co., 293 F. Supp. 94, 96 (N.D. Iowa 1968); Gary
Furniture & Appliance Co. v. Skinner, 288 Ala. 617, 624, 264 So. 2d 174, 181 (1972).
46. McKean, Products Liability: Trends and Implications, 38 U. Cm. L. Ruv.
3, 39 (1970); Pasley, The Protection of the Purchaser and Consumer Under the
Law of the U.S.A., 32 MoD. L. REv. 241, 255-59 (1969); Prosser, The Assault Upon
The Citadel (Strict Liability To The Consumer), 69 YALn L.J. 1099, 1119-24 (1960);
Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products And Strict Liability, 32
TENN. L. Rxv. 363, 366 (1965); Comment, Reforming the Law of Consumer Re-
covery and Enterprise Liability Through the Uniform Commercial Code, 60 VA. L.
REv. 1013, 1023 (1974).
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Another argument in support of the continued vitality of the "trust
fund" theory can be drawn from United States v. Palakow.47 This case
involved the application of the Wisconsin postponed abatement statute.
The Wisconsin statute contained a two year grace period, but the Small
Business Administration, as plaintiff, had failed to commence its action
within the allowable period. The defendants were former directors of
the corporation who claimed to be protected from liability by the statute,
which covered claims against directors as well as the corporation.
The Small Business Administration attempted to avoid the applica-
tion of the statute by claiming that, because it had become a shareholder
of the corporation prior to its dissolution, its action against the defendants
was in its capacity as a shareholder against the defendants in their capacity
as directors for failing to distribute to the SBA its pro-rata share of the
assets. The SBA argued that this type of action was not subject to the
two year limitation. In reversing the district court's judgment for the
defendants, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
agreed with the SBA and declared that even if the nature of the liability
asserted against one of the defendants was in his capacity as a director,
it would not be barred by the postponed abatement statute.
The court said that because the "main purpose" of the postponed
abatement statute was:
. .. to extend the life of the corporation for a two year period
after dissolution so as to allow suits to be brought by and against
the corporation which would ordinarily abate upon dissolution,
[t]hose suits which would not have abated upon dissolution are
not covered by ... [the statute]. 48
A director's personal liability for improperly distributing assets to the
shareholders upon dissolution is a cause of action which did not abate
before the statutes were adopted.4 9 Thus, the statute had no application
to the cause of action. Similarly, it could be argued that because the "trust
fund" cause of action also is one which did not abate upon dissolution,
but in fact first arose on dissolution, the statutes have no effect on the
"trust fund" type of action.
Viewing the situation from the position of the holder of a product
dissatisfaction claim who is attempting to pursue a claim barred under
the postponed abatement statute by utilizing the "trust fund" theory,
the best that can be said is that the law is unclear and uncertain. Although
it may well have been the intent of the draftsmen to overrule the "trust
fund" theory, legislative intent to the same effect has not been clearly
enunciated. An attempt to pursue the trust fund remedy might still succeed.
Courts may be unwilling to find that equitable jurisdiction has been
47. 438 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'g 298 F. Supp. 1378 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
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precluded on such faint evidence.5 0 The strong public policy of encourag-
ing enforcement of product dissatisfaction claims in an attempt to foster safer
practices is currently enjoying great influence in the courts. There is
insufficient case law in this area to date to discount the continued vitality
of the "trust fund" theory.
IV. CLAIMS AGAINST THE PURCHASER OF THE
ASSETS OF A DISSOLVED CORPORATION
The discussion thus far has assumed that the shareholders or directors
of a corporation have had some business reason for dissolving the corpora-
tion, and, as part of this dissolution process, the assets have been sold
to a third party. While this may occur occasionally, most of the time an
acquisition-minded corporation has approached the directors and share-
holders seeking to acquire the business. The shareholders and directors
may find the offer appealing for any number of reasons and agree to a
sale of their business.
The corporation which is making the purchase can do so by any one
of several well-established acquisition techniques. The acquiring corpora-
tion ordinarily makes the decision of which technique to use. The two
corporations may merge, with the corporation which is acquiring the other
business ordinarily being the surviving corporation. Or, the two corpora-
tions may consolidate into a new corporation. In either of these situations,
the corporation entity which remains after the acquisition is completed
is responsible for all of the liabilities of the acquired corporation, including
product dissatisfaction claims. 51
As an alternative, the acquiring corporation may acquire the seller
by buying its outstanding shares from the shareholders. In this case the
original seller of the product is still in existence and product dissatisfaction
claims may be asserted directly against it. Finally, the acquiring corpora-
tion may purchase the assets of the selling corporation.
Where the acquiring corporation has chosen to purchase the assets,
the injured party faces a problem not present if one of the other three
common approaches has been utilized. A corporation or other entity which
purchases the assets of another business traditionally has not been liable
for claims against the selling business. The general rule in such cases was
expressed in Kloberdanz v. Joy Manufacturing Company52 in the following
language:
[W]here one company sells or otherwise transfers all its assets
to another company the latter is not liable for the debts and lia-
bilities of the transferor, except where: (1) the purchaser expressly
50. See H. MCCLINTOCK, PRINCIPLES OF EqurrY § 49 (1948). According to Mc-
Clintock, equity jurisdiction is generally held not to be diminished, once clearly
established, merely because the remedy at law has since become adequate by the
adoption of a statute. However, McClintock recognizes that the principle is not
uniformly adhered to.
51. This rule is now imposed by statute in all jurisdictions. See MODEL
Bus. CoRP. Aar. ANN. § 76 (e); Z. CAvrrcH, BUsINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 167.04 (1975).
52. 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968).
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or impliedly agrees to assume such debts; (2) the transaction
amounts to a consolidation or merger of the seller and purchaser;
(3) the purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the
selling corporation; or (4) the transaction is entered into fraudu-
lently in order to escape liability for such debts.5 3
This concept is a basic part of the corporate law of the United States
and language expressing the concept is found in essentially the same form
as that quoted above in cases decided as early as the turn of the century. 4
The existence of this rule of law has led businesses interested in acquisi-
tion of another business to utilize a purchase of assets approach instead
of a merger, consolidation, or purchase of stock because any of these latter
approaches will lead to the assumption of liabilities of the selling corpo-
ration.55
The insulation from liability enjoyed by corporations which acquire
a business through a purchase of assets rather than through alternative
acquisition techniques is as much a "citadel" 56 against the chances of
recovery as privity once was to warranty claims by remote parties against
'those in the chain of manufacture and distribution of a product. Like
the citadel of privity, assaults upon the insulation enjoyed by such pur-
chasers of assets have continued, and have begun to meet with some success.
The development of the law in this area is really just beginning, but the
successful cases have thus far involved one or both of the following theories:
the acquiring corporation is a continuation of the predecessor corpora-
tion, or there has been a defacto merger or consolidation of the two
enterprises.
A. The Continuation or Successor Theory
Historically, the liability of a purchaser of assets for claims against
the business which sold those assets originated from contract claims by
53. Id. at 820.
54. Virtually identical expressions of the test are found in Chase v. Michigan
Tel. Co., 121 Mich. 631, 80 N.W. 717 (1899), and Swing v. Empire Lumber Co.,
105 Minn. 356, 117 N.W. 467 (1908). See also Spring Creek Oil Corp. v. Dillman,
90 Okla. 129, 215 P. 1053 (1923); Burkholder v. Okmulgee Coal Co., 82 Okla. 80,
196 P. 679 (1921).
55. Z. CAvTCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATONS § 161.01-.02 (1975); Juenger & Schul-
man, Assets Sales & Product Liability, 22 WAYNE L. REv. 39, 40 (1975). The avoid-
ance of liabilities is actually one of the principal reasons for using a purchase of
assets approach to an acquisition, at least where an entire business operation is
being acquired.
Tax reasons are sometimes cited as a motivation, because the asset purchase
results in a stepped-up basis while the other methods of acquisition do not. How-
ever, the acquiring corporation can obtain a stepped-up basis, at least in a stock
acquisition, by complying with the requirements of I.R.C. § 334 (b). See Z. CAVITC,
id. at § 175.08-.12; Hasday, The Bouncing Basis Rule: A Proposed Revision of
Section 334(b), 53 TAxEs 668 (1975).
56. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966).
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general creditors of the seller.5 7 Courts were reluctant to impose liability
on the purchaser of assets unless there was a substantial identity of owner-
ship of the two corporations or the circumstances indicated that the transfer
was motivated by a desire to avoid meeting the seller's obligations. Thus,
in Ozan Lumber Co. v. Davis Sewing Machine Co., 58 the court stated:
... in order to recover from a corporation of one name the obliga-
tions of a corporation of another name, upon the theory that the
former is a mere continuation of the latter, it must appear that the
former is the same legal entity as that whose obligation is sought
to be charged upon it as one of its own; that is to say, it must be
the same legal person, having a continued existence under a new
name.59
This reluctance to impose liability on a purchaser of assets who acquired
even all of the assets and then operated the acquired business in the same
form, as a continuation of or successor to the seller of the assets, has car-
ried over into other areas. Thus, on at least two related questions, the
liability of the acquiring corporation for tax liabilities of the former
owner of the assets60 and the liability of the acquiring corporation under
collective bargaining agreements,61 the same general results have been
reached.
The third exception to the rule found in the Kloberdanz decision,
continuity of ownership, is rarely of value.62 The acquiring corporation
57. See, e.g., Pringle v. Hunsicker, 154 Cal. App. 2d 789, 316 P.2d 742 (1957);
J. F. Anderson Lumber Co. v. Myers, 296 Minn. 33, 206 N.W.2d 365 (1973); Lamb
v. Leroy Corp., 85 Nev. 289, 454 P.2d 24 (1969); McAlister v. American Ry.
Express Co., 179 N.C. 556, 103 S.E. 129 (1920).
58. 284 F. 161 (D. Del. 1922).
59. Id. at 165.
60. Comment, Transferee Liability and The Reorganization, 40 U. COLO.
L. RF-v. 380 (1968); Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39 (1958).
61. Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel Employees, 417 U.S. 247 (1974); NLRB
v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972); John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964). See Gates, Successor Management's Obligations
Under Existing Collective Bargaining Agreements, 40 Mo. L. Rxv. 304 (1975).
62. This article concentrates on the effects of legitimate business transactions
on the ability of one who suffers product dissatisfaction to find a defendant against
whom the claim can be pressed. Where fraudulent transfers of assets or inadequate
consideration are involved, or the assets have not really been transferred to new
and different owners, a plaintiff should have little trouble in asserting his claim
against the entity acquiring the assets. See, e.g., Bishop v. Dura-Lite Mfg. Co.,
489 F.2d 710 (6th Cir. 1973) (continuity of ownership and business); Okmulgee
Window Glass Co. v. Frink, 260 F. 159 (8th Cir. 1919), cert. denied, 251 U.S.
563 (1920) (continuity of ownership and business); Alexander &c Baldwin, Inc.
v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &c Co., 385 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (continuity
of ownership and operations); Economy Refining c Serv. Co. v. Royal Nat'l Bank,
20 Cal. App. 3d 434, 97 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1971) (no consideration); Bergman &
Lefkow Ins. Agency v. Flash Cab Co., 110 Ill. App. 2d 415, 249 N.E.2d 729 (1969)
(continuity of ownership and business); Wolff v. Shreveport Gas, Elec., Light &c
Power Co., 138 La. 743, 70 So. 789 (1916) (continuity of ownership and business);
Fena v. Peppers Fruit Co., 185 Minn. 137, 239 N.W. 898 (1931) (incorporation
of sole proprietorship-identity of ownership and business); Jackson v. Diamond
T. Trucking Co., 100 N.J. Super. 186, 241 A.2d 471 (L. Div. 1968) (inadequate
consideration); Ruedy v. Toledo Factories Co., 61 Ohio App. 21, 22 N.E.2d 293
(1939) (continuity of ownership and business). 17
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is frequently a large corporation, and, even if the selling corporation's
shareholders receive stock of the acquiring corporation in payment for
the assets, there is no continuity of ownership because most of the share-
holders of the acquiring corporation will have had no relationship to
the seller of the assets. This has been sufficient to lead to a denial of
recovery against the acquiring corporation even though it continues to
run the acquired business as a subsidiary or division of a larger enterprise,
use the same name and tradenames, and employ the benefits of the former
owner's goodwill, customer lists, and records.63
However, in a recent case a plaintiff persuaded the court to impose
liability even without continuity of ownership. In Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.,64
an individual was injured by an explosion in the oven of a press sold
to his employer in 1959. The individual who manufactured the oven
died in 1962 and his estate sold the business to an employee group in 1963.
The employees formed the corporate defendant in the personal injury
suit, continued to use the former owner's name, and claimed to be a 40-
year-old business. Although the ownership of the business had changed
completely, the court noted that the defendant had taken over an ongoing
business, assumed all the benefits of its predecessor, continued to function
in the same manner, and produced the same products with the same em-
ployees. Even though the court did appear to rely heavily on the fact
that the same employees whose negligence led to the creation of the
defective product continued to be associated with the new owner of the
assets,65 this case clearly imposes liability on a continuation theory.
B. The De Facto Merger Theory
The facts in Shannon v. Samuel Langston Company,6 6 were more
typical than the facts in the Cyr case. In Shannon, the plaintiff was injured
in 1967 while operating a piece of machinery owned by his employer.
The machine had been manufactured about 1952 by a corporation called
the Samuel M. Langston Company. This corporation had sold its assets
to a subsidiary of the Harris Intertype Corporation, an unrelated corpora-
63. Cintron v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 395 F. Supp. 1147 (E.D. Pa. 1975). See
also Denolf v. Frank L. Jursik Co., 54 Mich. App. 584, 221 N.W.2d 458 (1974),
modified, 395 Mich. 661, 238 N.W.2d 1 (1976); National Dairy Prods. Corp. v.
Borden Co., 363 F. Supp. 978 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F.
Supp. 1250 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Copease Mfg. Co. v. Cormac Photocopy Corp.,
242 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d
842, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1975); Schwartz v. McGraw-Edison Co., 14 Cal. App. 3d
767, 92 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1971); Pringle v. Hunsicker, 154 Cal. App. 2d 789, 316
P.2d 742 (1957); Buis v. Peabody Coal Co., 41 Ill. App. 2d 317, 190 N.E.2d 507
(1963); J. F. Anderson Lumber Co. v. Myers, 296 Minn. 33, 206 N.W.2d 365
(1973); Lamb v. Leroy Corp., 85 Nev. 289, 454 P.2d 24 (1969); McKee v. Harris-
Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (L. Div. 1970), affd per curiam,
118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972); McAlister v. American Ry.
Express Co., 179 N.C. 556, 103 S.E. 129 (1920); Southwestern Gas, Light & Power
Co. v. Jay, 275 S.W. 735 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
64. 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
65. I'd. at 1154.
66. 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
[Vol. 411
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tion, in 1966, approximately a year before the injury. The subsidiary had
been formed specifically for the purpose of acquiring the selling corpora-
tion's assets and had a name very similar to that of the seller of the assets.
Later, the subsidiary was merged into the parent corporation and the
assets of the selling corporation were used in a division of the parent
called the Langston Division of Harris Intertype Corporation. The selling
corporation had dissolved after distributing the shares received in exchange
for its assets to its shareholders. The court noted that all of the tangible
and intangible assets of the seller had been acquired and that the business
was operated in substantially the same way it had been operated before
the sale. This continuity in operations, combined with a partial continua-
tion of ownership (the shareholders of the selling corporation had become
shareholders of the buying corporation), led the court to find that a
de facto merger had occurred. 67
In Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp.,68 the plaintiff was an
individual who was injured while using a piece of machinery owned by
his employer. The equipment had been manufactured by a corporation in
1966 or 1967. The corporation manufacturer later sold its assets to the
defendant for shares of the acquiring corporation. As is typical in such
acquisitions, the selling corporation agreed to change its name and dis-
solve, which it did some 18 months after the sale and about 6 months
after the injury to the plaintiff.
The court purported to distinguish, but in fact rejected, decisions
from other jurisdictions which refused to impose liability on the purchaser
of assets. 69 The court relied heavily on a line of cases recognizing the
right of dissenting shareholders to an appraisal of their shares on a sale of
assets just as if a merger had occured. 70 The court also observed that:
Denying Knapp the right to sue Rockwell because of the
barren continuation of TMW after the exchange with Rockwell
would allow a formality to defeat Knapp's recovery.
If we are to follow the philosophy of the Pennsylvania courts
that questions of an injured party's right to seek recovery are to be
resolved by an analysis of public policy considerations rather than
by a mere procrustean application of formalities, we must, in con-
67. Id. at 801. The court distinguished McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109
N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (L. Div. 1970), affd per curiam, 118 N.J. Super.
480, 288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972), a leading case in which recovery was denied,
because in that case the selling corporation had received cash, rather than stock,
so that not even a partial continuation in ownership was present. If the test to
be applied is purely one of continuity of business operations rather than con-
tinuity of ownership, the form of consideration received for the sale of an ongoing
business should be irrelevant. Juenger & Schulman, Asset Sales and Products
Liability, 22 WAYNE L. REv. 39, 53-54 (1975).
68. 506 F.2d 361 (3rd Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975).
69. Id. at 364-67.
70. Id. at 370-71. The leading case in this area is Farris v. Glenn Alden Corp.,
393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958). See also Applestein v. United Bd. & Carton Corp.,
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sidering whether the TMW-Rockwell exchange was a merger,
evaluate the public policy implications of that determination.7 1
In his concurring opinion, Judge Rosenn suggested a test for deter-
mining liability, under a de facto merger theory, of a corporation which
acquires assets of another business enterprise. Judge Rosenn stated:
I believe that, where a corporation purchases substantially all
the assets of a second corporation, the legislature intended to
impose the second corporation's tort liabilities on the acquiring
corporation at least if the following attributes of merger are
present:
(1) an ongoing business, including its name and goodwill, is
transferred to the acquiring corporation; and
(2) the corporation whose assets are acquired is dissolved
after distribution to its shareholders of the consideration
received from the acquiring corporation.72
Although some refinement may be necessary in less typical fact situa-
tions, the test proposed is both workable, and, from a policy standpoint,
a desirable one. When applied to the facts of the Knapp case, the test
allows the injured party to pursue his claim against a defendant. The
Knapp decision has been criticized because it refused to adhere to the
traditional distinction between acquisition based on a purchase of assetsa
and acquisition by purchases of shares, merger, or consolidation. Instead,
the decision should be applauded for refusing to exalt form over substance.
Both the "continuation or successor," and the de facto merger theories
provide the plaintiff with a defendant where the acquiring corporation,
in a case like Knapp, intends and will profit from the exploitation of the
selling corporation's goodwill, established customers, personnel, and in-
ternal procedures of manufacture and distribution. Under either theory,
a "pooling of interests and continuity of operation"74 leads to liability
for the seller's obligations. These two approaches are really alternative
ways of expressing the same concept. With the benefits of a business
continuation should go the responsibility the selling corporation had for
product dissatisfaction claims which would have been asserted against it
if it had still been in existence.
In other situations, as where the purchaser of tangible assets does
not acquire and use intangible assets such as the seller's name, goodwill,
and cusomer lists, so that it does not clearly appear that the acquiring
71. Id. at 369.
72. Id. at 371.
73. Comment, Assumption of Products Liability in Corporate Acquisitions,
55 B.U.L. REv. 86, 105-06 (1975). But see Note, Products Liability-Corporate
Transaction Structured as a Sale of Assets Treated as De Facto Merger so as to
Hold Transferee Corporation Accountable for Products Liability Claim Against
Dissolved Transferor, 6 SE'rON HALL L. REv. 477 (1975). For similar criticism of
the Cyr decision see Note, Corporations-Successors Tort Liability for Acts or
Omissions of Predecessor, 16 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 676 (1975).
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corporation has acquired a continuing business enterprise, courts will
undoubtedly continue to resist demands to impose responsibility.7 5 In
such situations, the acquiring corporation has not enjoyed the benefits
discussed as fully as where it trades directly on the established nature of
the acquired business. However, it would be overly simplistic to suggest
that liability should not be imposed unless this business continuation
test is satisfied as dearly as it was in Knapp.
At the opposite extreme from the acquisition of an ongoing business
operation is the purchase of less than all, or perhaps even all of the tangi-
ble assets, where the acquiring corporation merely integrates this machin-
ery and equipment into its own operations. In such cases, there is no
continuity of operation.
There are many cases which fall between the extremes. In these cases,
the transaction must be carefully scrutinized to determine the extent to
which the acquiring corporation has benefited from the acquisition of
more than the mere physical assets of the seller. If the facts indicate that
the acquiring corporation has acquired and used some of the benefits of
the prior business as a going concern, then the courts will have to face
the difficult question of deciding whether the extent of the benefits re-
ceived and utilized justifies the imposition of liability for product dissatis-
faction claims. In cases of doubt, it appears that the policy justifications
discussed in the Knapp, Cyr, and Shannon decisions would justify an
imposition of liability.7 6
Kloberdanz v. Joy Manufacturing Go., 7 a leading case in which re-
covery was denied, is illustrative of a fact situation between the two extremes
which would be difficult to decide under the business continuation test
adopted in these new cases. The acquisition agreement between the buying
and selling corporations provided that the buyer would acquire all the
property and assets of the seller, including the corporate name. The buyer
had the right to use the name for a division or subsidiary of the buyer,
or as a trade name. The only significant assets not acquired were the land
and buildings, and employment contracts.
Some liabilities were expressly assumed. These included certain "lia-
bilities" which are more likely to be treated as something of value to
an ongoing operation-outstanding purchase orders, outstanding obliga-
tions for supplies and components of the seller's product, and a sublease
on some warehouse space. These facts support a finding of a business
continuation.
75. In Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1152, n.13 (1st Cir. 1974), the
court cited with approval cases in which courts had refused to find a de facto
merger because of an insufficient degree of business continuity. Accord, Comstock
v. Great Lakes Distrib. Co., 209 Kan. 306, 496 P.2d 1308 (1972).
76. Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 369 (3d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1153-54
(1st Cir. 1974); Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 802 (W.D.
Mich. 1974).
77. 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968). 21
Wallach: Wallach: Products Liability: A Remedy in Search of a Defendant
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Other facts, however, support a contrary conclusion. None of the share-
holders or.principal officers of the seller became 6mployees of the buyer,
nor apparently, did any of the other former employees of the seller. The
buyer never used the seller's name, except as a trademark on thirteen out
of an undisclosed number of tools sold by the buyer. Other facts relevant
to the determination, especially the extent to which the buyer dealt with
the seller's former customers, are not reported. Nevertheless, on the basis
of the reported facts, it is likely that a court following the business con-
tinuation test would impose liability on the buyer of the assets in this case.
Another theory has been advanced for imposing liability on the entity
which acquires assets of a business which is no longer in existence. This
theory could be used as an alternative to the business continuation test.
C. Subsequent Duty to Warn
A duty to warn of possible dangers to users of products is now well
established in the products liability area.78 Where the dangers were not
contemplated by those involved in the chain of manufacture and distri-
bution at the time the product was placed on the marketplace, it has
been suggested that a subsequent duty to warn arises upon discovery of
the existence of a dangerous propensity after the product has been sold.79
The subsequent duty to warn is not nearly as well established as the duty
to warn, at the time of the initial marketing, of dangers associated with
the use of a product. This subsequent duty to warn, which is itself an
emerging concept in the products liability area, has been combined with
the successor theory to successfully avoid a motion for summary judgment
by a purchaser of assets who was a defendant in a products liability action.
-In Shane v. Hobam, Inc.,8 0 the only reported decision utilizing this
approach, an individual who was injured while using a piece of manu-
facturing equipment brought an action against the corporation which
had acquired the assets of the manufacturer of the equipment 14 years
after the machine had been sold to the injured individual's employer.
The court rejected the reasoning of a prior case 8l which had refused to
accept this subsequent duty to warn theory as a possible basis for imposing
liability on the purchaser of the assets of a corporation which had manu-
78. Dillard & Hart, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty to
Warn, 41 VA. L. REv. 145 (1955); Kidwell, The Duty to Warn: A Description of
the Model of Decision, 53 TmX L. REv. 1375 (1975); Noel, Products Defective
Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256 (1969); Comment,
Foreseeability In Product Design And Duty To Warn Cases-Distintions And Mis-
conceptions, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 228; Jackson v. Coast Paint 9: Lacquer Co., 499
F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
79. Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d. 102 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96
S. Ct. 1113 (1976). Cf. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1106(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
80. 332 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
81. Id. at 530. In Chadwick v. Air Reduction Co., 239 F. Supp. 247 (N.D.
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factured and marketed a defective product. The court did not necessarily
accept the theory, in part because of a number of unanswered factual
questions. The court said:
if Hobam actually knew that the previously manufactured
machine was significantly defective, was 'Hobam obligaied to advise
all of Smith's previous customers of the nature, of the defect?
Was Hobam obligated to notify all, original purchasers of the
nature of the defect even when the original purchasers were no
longer serviced by Hobam and had no other business relationship
with Hobam? Plaintiff is treading on uncharted precedential seas
and while there may be a serious question as to whether he has
tipped the balance of precedent in his favor, I am reluctant to,
and therefore will not, grant a summary judgmentbefdoe pertinent
factual gaps in the present case are filled in, thereby permitting
the above questions to be answered with greater precision.82
Shane leaves at least one very important question unanswered. Is
the degree of "pooling of interests and continuity of operation" 83 which
must be present to justify the imposition of liability under a subsequent
duty to warn theory greater than, less tbhan, or identical to the degree
necessary to impose liability under the ."continuation or successor" or
de facto merger theories? It is possible that the courts -will not require'
as significant a degree of continuity of opern:tions under the subsequent
duty to warn theory. If they do not, this theory may ultimately become
more important in cases which are close under the other theories. The
reason courts may not require the same degree of continuity is that the
cost associated with the respofnsibility, at least where' the: responsibility,
is met, should not be nearly as great..
Chadwick v. Air Reduction Co.,84 the earlier decision which rejected
the subsequent duty to warn theory, contains a fact situation which illus-
trates the policy considerations present in "tese cases. The defeidant had
purchased all of the assets of a corporation which manufactured incubators
used by hospitals in the care of premature babies' A. baby had been burned
when his foot became lodged in the heating element of the incubator. The
defendant was alleged to have had actual knowledge of defects in this
model of incubators. Assuming that the incubator was defective because
of an insufficient shield on the heating element, and that the purchaser
of the assets had knowledge of this defect, should it have been required'
at least to warn known buyers of the product- of the dangers associated
with its continued use? The court thought ilot, yet the decision seems
erroneous. The cost of warning hospitals known to have purchased these
incubators would have been relatively small. The ris s to users of the
product was large. Under these circumstances, a warning should be required
and liability imposed for failure to warn, even if the degree of business
82. Id. at 530.
83. Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 801 n.1 (W.D. Mich.
1974).
84. 239 F. Supp. 247 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
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continuity is insufficient to support a finding of liability under one of
the other theories.
These evolving theories of de facto merger, liability as a continuation
or successor to the dissolved corporation, or violation of a subsequent duty
to warn may produce a defendant against whom an injured claimant may
successfully assert product dissatisfaction claims. There is, however, at
least one important question which has yet to be resolved, even if liability
is to be imposed under one of these theories.
V. THE EXTENT OF POTENTIAL RECovEREs
If a product liability claim is asserted against a dissolved corporation
under a postponed abatement statute, the corporation's potential liability
is, of course, unlimited, other than by the total value of all assets owned
by the corporation. It is very unlikely that the shareholders would have
any potential personal liability under a "piercing" theory.85 If the grace
period of the postponed abatement statute has expired by the time the
product liability claim is asserted, the shareholder's potential liability under
the "trust fund" theory, assuming that theory is available to the claimant,
should be limited to the value of the assets received by that shareholder.8 6
However, unresolved problems are raised by a consideration of the extent
of the potential liability of the corporation which acquired the assets of
the dissolved corporation.
A stock purchase would limit the extent of liability to the value of
the assets acquired, unless the injured party could convince a court to
hold the acquiring corporation liable to the extent the acquired corpora-
tion was unable to satisfy the claim.87 If the acquiring corporation merges
or consolidates with the acquired corporation, its potential liability under
a products liability claim could exceed the value of the assets acquired.
There is no authority which suggests the liability could be limited in
any way under statutory mergers and consolidation.88
Corporations which acquire a business by means of a purchase of
85. Imposing liability on shareholders for corporate obligations is often called
"piercing the corporate veil." Shareholder liabilty only results when fraud or
legality are involved, or less often, if the corporation was inadequately capitalized
upon formation. H. HauNN, LAw or CORPonnOuS §9 146-48 (1970); N. LArrN,LAw OF CORP'ORATIONS §9 14-15 (1971).
86. Gaskins v. Bonfils, 79 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1985); Hutton v. Commis-
sioner, 59 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1932); Collins v. Aviation Serv., Inc., 225 So. 2d 241
(La. App. 1969). But see King v. Coosa Valley Mineral Prods. Co., 283 Ala. 197,
215 So. 2d 275 (1968) (shareholder liability can exceed value of assets received).
New Jersey has a statutory provision allowing creditors to trace the assets of a
dissolved corporation into the hands of the shareholders. The statute apparently
limits the shareholder's liability to his rateable part of the claim. Juenger &
Schulman, Assets Sales and Products Liability, 22 WAYrE L. REV. 39, 42 (1975).
87. "Piercing the corporate veil" is even more unlikely in this context than
it would be if the initial shareholders retained the ownership of the shares. See
note 85 supra.
88. Z. CAvITc, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 161.02[2] (1975); W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 7112, 7118, 7123 (1973).
[Vol. 41
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assets could, until the recent decisions discussed in this article, anticipate
escaping liability completely so long as the transaction was legitimate.
However, under the new theories, the corporation which uses an asset
purchase as its method of acquisition may now be exposed to liability
for product dissatisfaction claims. If traditional approaches are followed
in determining the scope of liability, the theory used in determining to
impose liability may well make a difference. If a court adopts a successor
in interest or continuation theory, the potential liability would probably
not exceed the value of the assets purchased.8 9 However, if the de facto
merger theory is used by the court, the acquiring corporation would be
exposed to unlimited liability, similar to that imposed upon a statutory
merger.90
In cases where the amount of the claim exceeds the value of the
assets acquired, the theory chosen for imposing liability could obviously
be important to both the claimant and the acquiring corporation. Yet,
it is difficult to suggest a preferable approach. It could be argued that
the claimant should not get a recovery greater than the recovery he would
have gotten if the sale of the assets had not occurred. If the sale had not
taken place, the actual recovery against the corporation would not exceed
the value of its own assets, unless the corporation had had products
liability insurance, even if the claimant's judgment was for a greater
amount. However, plaintiffs of all types benefit from apparent windfalls
in all types of situations.
If a person inherits a large sum of money, all those with claims against
him get a perhaps unexpected but improved opportunity for realizing
on their claims. If this person cannot expect to successfully argue that his
creditors are not entitled to a windfall, perhaps the acquiring corporation
will also be unsuccessful in urging a court to accept the theory which will
limit its own liability. Until this problem is resolved, acquisition-minded
corporations, fearing products liability exposure under a de facto merger
theory, may demand that the acquisition occur under a purchase of stock
approach. Their hope would be that this approach would at least con-
tinue in the future to limit potential liability to the value of the assets
of the acquired corporation which has now become a subsidiary of the
acquiring corporation.
VI. CONCLUSION
A products liability claimant who discovers that a corporation which
might have been liable to him for the consequences of his product dis-
satisfaction has been acquired by another corporation, and has since been
dissolved, is in an unenviable situation. At a minimum, he faces the likeli-
hood of a more complicated lawsuit involving factual and legal issues
89. W. FszrcHE, supra note 88, at § 7129; Okmulgee Window Glass Co. v.
Frink, 260 F. 159 (8th Cir. 1919), cert. denied, 251 U.S. 563 (1920); McKee v. Stand-
ard Minerals Corp., 18 Del. Ch. 97, 156 A. 193 (1931).
90. See note 88 supra.
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which would not be present if the corporation were still in existence.
The claimant also faces the possibility that he may have a remedy without
a defendant against whom the .remedy can be asserted successfully.
If the corporation was dissolved -recently enough so that the grace
period of the applicable postponed abatement statute has not expired,
the claimant will be able to assert his -claim against the dissolved corpo-
ration. However, if -the grace 'period has expired, or the cause of action
is one which does not fall 'within the types of claims permitted by the
statute, 'th&dclaimant will be unable to assert his claim against the corpo-
ration. It is fairly: clear that. the statutes, because they are in derogation
of the common law abatement rule, are to be strictly construed. The claim
must be one permitted by both the scope and time limitations of the
statute or it will be held'to 'have abated.
The claim' may be asserted' against 'the former shareholders of the
corporation, either under a p ostponed abatement statute or under the
"trust fund" thedry. To the"extent the 'claim is asserted under a statute,
the claimant faces the same'problems present under a claim against the
dissolved corporation. The "'trust' fund" theory should continue. 'to be
available to daimahts :in the 'absence of a clear legislative intent to abolish
its use. The theory will provide 'defendants if' the claimant can avoid a
laches or statute' of limitations 'defense.
There are 'tvo 'elements'affecting the claimant's chances 6f holding
the acquiring corporation responsible for his product dissatisfaction claim
where a purchase of assets" has been used. First, the courts must begin
to apply the theories discussed in these recent cases consistently.0 ' Second,
the claimant maust be able to sh'or a sufficient degree of business continua-
tion tojustify' tie' imposition of liability under one or more of these
theories. The degree of busiriess 'continuity required before -liability will
be Jmposed'hs not yet been detrmined, and perhaps cannot "be. How-
ever, it is dear'that ihe acquisition "f intangible assets, such as the corporate
name, tradedi'arks and custofiidr"lists, is considered more significant by
the courts than 'e amoun't of physical assets acquired.
91. The only recent decision dearly adopting these cases as precedent is
Ray v. Alad Corp., - Cal. App. 3d - , 127 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1976). In
Lopata v. Bemis Co., 406 F. Supp.. 521 (E.D. Pa. 1975), the court, in applyin
New Jersey law, refused to follow knapp, distinguished Shannon on the facts, and
granted summary judgment for the pprchaser of the assets. The court relied
on McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (L. Div. 1970),
afrd per curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972), a leading
New Jersey case in which recovery against a purchaser of assets was denied. See
also Cinocca v. Baxter Laboratories, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. Okla. 1975)
(recognizing purchaser's potential liability under de facto merger theory, without
citation to casey);" Cintron v. Amstead Indus., Inc., 395 F. Supp. 1147 (E.D. Pa.
1975) (refusing to apply these theories, without citation to cases); Husak v. Berkel,
Inc., 234 Pa. Super.,452, 341 A.2d '174' (1975) (recognizing purchaser's potential
liability, without citation to cases)';* Granthum v. Textile Mach. Works,, 230 Pa.
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The courts might not require as significant a degree of continuity
in operations under the subsequent duty to warn theory as they would
under the continuation, successor or de facto merger theories. The limited
authority in this area to date indicates, however, that even a claimant
relying on the subsequent duty to warn theory must show a significant
degree of business continuity in order to be successful.
27
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